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Abstract 
After a decade of negotiations, countries adopted a new, legally-binding agreement on climate change. 
The excitement for a new era in the climate regime is palpable among pundits and policymakers alike. 
But such enthusiasm largely overlooks that most of the Paris Agreement’s provisions represent 
continuity with existent climate policy, not a break with the past. This paper argues that the Paris 
Agreement is a dangerous form of incrementalism, in two ways. First, it repackages existing rules that 
have already proven inadequate to reduce emissions and improve resilience. Second, states and non-
state actors celebrate the Agreement as a solution, conferring legitimacy on its rules. I suggest that, 
beyond the strong desire to avoid failure, developing countries and NGOs accepted the Paris Agreement 
to secure the participation of the US and to uphold previous agreements. Given the reification of 
existing rules, the ratchet-up mechanism and non-state actors stand as the hopes to catalyze climate 
action. 
Introduction 
In December 2015, delegates, NGOs, journalists, and scholars, myself included, applauded the adoption 
of the Paris Agreement. After a decade of minor successes and major failures, countries negotiated a 
treaty acceptable to all. Better still, it seemed surprisingly ambitious. But the celebration was largely 
unjustified given the Agreement’s content (Anderson 2015). 
The Paris Agreement is a form of dangerous incrementalism, in two ways. First, it repackages existing 
rules that have so far proved to be an inadequate response to climate change. The Agreement creates 
four new institutions: the Paris Committee on Capacity-building, the implementation and compliance 
mechanism, a platform for local communities and indigenous peoples, and the “Article 6” market 
mechanism. While nationally-determined contributions (NDCs) are a new concept, they are a 
reincarnation of the bottom-up approach created by the Copenhagen Accord and affirmed in the 
Cancun agreement (Falkner 2016; Savaresi 2016). 
Taken as a repackaged set of institutions, the Paris Agreement may be unable to reverse the trend of 
rising emissions. Emissions reductions stemming from the intended NDCs will slow the rate of emissions 
growth, although aggregate emissions will rise (UNFCCC 2015a) suggesting a global temperature 
increase between 2.6°C and 3.1°C by 2100 (Fawcett et al., 2015). Under the Cancun system, 141 
countries, representing nearly 87% of emissions, submitted pledges. The Paris Agreement has intended 
NDCs from 190 countries representing 94.6% of emissions. In addition to using existing institutions, the 
Agreement adds only 7.6% of global emissions to the regime, although some countries, notably China, 
submitted more ambitious pledges. The Agreement fails to meet the needs of the world’s most 
vulnerable for adaptation, loss and damage, and financial support (Sharma 2017) and appears unlikely 
to be effective, with few incentives to promote compliance or discourage free riding (Bang, Hovi, & 
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Skodvin, 2016). It lacks provisions to regulate interactions with non-parties (Kemp 2017), a concern in 
the wake of the US withdrawal.  
Second, the Paris Agreement is dangerously incremental because of its widespread legitimation, leading 
many to assert that the solution to climate change is now at hand. Even if NGOs and states privately 
thought the Paris Agreement was an inadequate response to climate change, they legitimized it. 
Developing countries praised it as a landmark of climate governance. Saint Lucia, for the Caribbean 
Community (CARICOM), a group highly vulnerable to climate change, described the Agreement as a 
“resounding triumph of multilateralism.” Tuvalu, a country renown for saying the Copenhagen Accord, 
would “betray our people and sell our future” declared that the Paris Agreement, in saving Tuvalu, “will 
have saved the world.” Even Nicaragua, the one country that spoke against the deal, outlined the 
inadequacy of the “voluntary responsibility” of the pledging system as a “path to failure,” but did not 
block consensus. 1  
Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) almost unanimously applauded the Agreement. They could 
have denounced it, potentially undermining its legitimacy. But, in a review of 50 NGO press releases, 
only three publicly held a negative view of the Agreement.2 These were members of the climate justice 
movement, who decried the Agreement as the “Great Polluter’s Escape,” a “deliberate plan to make the 
rich richer and the poor poorer”, and “more empty promises and false solutions” (One World 2015). 
Others, from environmental NGOs to cities, and businesses to faith groups, welcomed the Agreement as 
an achievement and foundation for future climate action. 
The enthusiasm imbued early scholarship. More sober assessments are emerging, showing the Paris 
Agreement as neither a revolution nor revelation. I seek to contribute to this rebalancing by offering 
ideas why this dangerous incrementalism occurred. Many understood in Paris that the treaty would not 
constitute solution to climate change, and yet they publicly supported it. After Copenhagen, there was 
palpable sense that the UNFCCC could not survive another such failure. Developing countries, like many 
others, wanted above all to avoid failure, and to end negotiations that detract from implementation. 
They therefore consented to an agreement that is not in their interests. Beyond the binary choice that 
any agreement is better than no agreement, I suggest that there were other reasons that constrained 
developing countries’ decision making to legitimize the Paris Agreement, primarily that it builds on a 
series of existing institutions that had their own legitimacy and that aligned with US demands.  
The Best of the Alternatives 
Developing countries and NGOs faced a difficult decision in Paris: is it better to agree to an incremental 
agreement today, or hold out for a better agreement later? If negotiations failed, global climate 
governance would still have the existing stock of institutions, but not rationalized into a cycle of 
submitting NDCs, and reviewing collective progress in the global stocktake, which informs future NDCs 
that are to be successively more ambitious (the “ratchet up mechanism”). It was unclear if a better deal 
would ever be on the table, especially given the negotiation process for the Paris Agreement. 
Failure seemed plausible throughout the negotiations. Immediately before the Paris conference, the 
draft text looked far from ambitious or complete. Riddled with brackets, each set surrounding phrases 
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without consensus, the draft grew throughout 2015 as parties added text rather than reaching 
compromise. Even halfway into the Paris conference, the draft revealed continued contention, with over 
800 brackets (IISD 2015). This proliferation of brackets masked how narrow the options had effectively 
become. 
Developing countries, sometimes with some developed countries, put forward ideas to raise the 
ambition of the Agreement, but concessions in Paris were few. The reference to 1.5°C in the global goal 
amounts to a promise to “pursue efforts.” Even securing an article devoted to loss and damage, a key 
demand of developing countries to separate loss and damage from adaptation, was a limited win. 
Liability is excluded and the separation from adaptation is blurred. There are no titles for the 
Agreement’s articles to avoid explicitly recognizing loss and damage (Biniaz 2016), and it reaffirms the 
role of the Cancun Adaptation Framework. Other options, such as multilateral reviews of NDCs before 
their finalization, found little traction.  
Instead, the developing and developed countries involved secured the ratchet up mechanism that could, 
over time, raise the ambition of the Paris Agreement. This was the one win that could hold promise and 
that lessened the sting of adopting an insufficient Agreement. Every five years, countries will hold the 
global stocktake. This period of reflection and likely pressure from NGOs, coupled with the requirement 
to submit successively more ambitious NDCs, is designed to inspire more ambition in the overall system.  
Beyond the obvious benefits of ending negotiations for a treaty, the ratchet up mechanism is a 
significant consolation that the Agreement could improve over time. The mechanism can serve as a 
guard against complacency that could creep in when the public attention that often accompanies 
negotiations for a treaty subside. Because of the aggregate nature of the stocktake, NGOs may have a 
key role, serving as whistleblowers (Faulkner 2016). These opportunities will come every few years, 
during the global stocktake and when NDCs are communicated, leaving perhaps fewer openings for 
many NGOs to influence the process than they enjoyed during the negotiations (Allan 2018). As 
delegates were aware, there are review mechanisms, including under the Convention, the Kyoto 
Protocol, and the Cancun agreement, and ambition remains low. Still, developing countries and NGOs 
accepted and celebrated the Agreement, not just to avoid failure and secure the ratchet up mechanism, 
but also because of two interlinked considerations that informed their choice: the need to bring the US 
on board, and, partly because of that need, the difficulties of over-turning existing institutions. 
There were strong signals that the US would ratify the treaty, if it had certain features. The US could not 
ratify a treaty with new obligations beyond what they previously agreed to, putting the world, as Kemp 
(2016) explains, in a “ratification straitjacket.” For the US to agree to the Paris Agreement, it would have 
to use existing institutions. This constraint ruled out a legally-binding obligation for developed countries 
to adopt quantified, economy-wide targets. The ratification straitjacket also meant that the Agreement 
had to be annexed to a COP decision, and NDCs could not be annexed or in any other way inscribed in 
the Agreement, which could imply a new legal obligation. The most significant climate free rider agreed 
with the Paris Agreement, representing a win for vulnerable countries in itself.  
The existing institutions also had legitimacy among parties, in both ideational and strategic terms. 
Parties may have viewed existing institutions as constitutive of climate policy, as “natural” ingredients 
for the Paris Agreement, which perhaps explains why there were so few attempts to renegotiate the 
bottom-up approach, or other existing institutions. Not even NGOs argued for a return to legally-binding 
mitigation targets. The Kyoto Protocol was languishing; still today there are not enough ratifications to 
bring the Doha Amendment from 2012 into force. Parties sealed the bottom-up approach into the Paris 
Agreement in 2013, when they agreed to the intended NDCs. Debates lingered on what “intended” 
meant, either to signal parties’ intentions before the treaty takes effect, or, as India argued, that parties 
would intend to meet their NDCs. But it was clear the Paris Agreement would be bottom-up. 
Strategically, vulnerable countries likely viewed these institutions as the best option on the table. Like 
the financial and technology mechanisms established in 2010, perhaps these institutions could deliver, 
given the chance. Using these institutions would also avoid opening old issues.  
Many of the institutions in the Paris Agreement were established as part of “package deals,” including 
greater transparency for developing countries (in 2007, 2009, and 2010), references to 1.5°C (in 2010), 
and the need for a market mechanism (in 2011). There would likely be social opprobrium if a country 
sought to untie a previous package that was carefully balanced to allow all to claim their interests were 
met. In the current “rulebook” negotiations for the Paris Agreement, parties routinely remind one 
another not to upset the Agreement’s careful balance. Opening previous agreements would lead to 
other countries re-inserting their pet issues to try to get a better deal, complicating the agenda and 
further dwindling trust.  
Such social pressure also applied to other agreements, such as US-China bilateral commitment that 
stipulated that countries “in a position to do so” could contribute to climate finance. While the language 
was debated during the Paris conference, China’s lead negotiator, Xie Zhenhua noted in a press 
conference that the wording was settled, pointing to the bilateral statement. If the two largest emitters, 
one a provider and the other a recipient (and provider) of climate finance, agreed on the future of 
financial flows, consent by others seemed a fait accompli. Developing countries would get an extension 
of the promise of 100 billion per year by 2020 to 2025, but no new financial commitment. The bilateral 
deal extended to the world, just as the demands of the US to use existing institutions shaped the 
decisions available to other countries. Years of incremental progress partly locked countries into 
legitimating the Paris Agreement, a progression of the years of climate policy countries collectively built 
over decades.  
Securing consent 
Negotiation strategies by powerful countries and the conference Presidency helped remove any last 
opportunities to block the agreement. The US employed a range of techniques to increase pressure to 
adopt an Agreement made according to its requirements. The High Ambition Coalition led by the 
Marshall Islands and the US was a media and NGO darling that also servced to ostracize countries such 
as India and Saudi Arabia that some believed could block a deal. As the US Climate Envoy Todd Stern 
explained to the media: “There are some countries here who are not in the coalition and, indeed, would 
seek a more minimal outcome” (Clark and Stothard 2015). Such coalition building has previously helped 
secure the consent of low-income countries for climate agreements (Ciplet, Roberts & Khan 2015). By 
aligning themselves with the US, including marching triumphantly together into the plenary hall, 
developing countries had already acceded to the Agreement. Participating in the momentum and 
helping to marginalize other developing countries, states vulnerable to climate change conceded their 
ability speak against or block the treaty. 
The last resort for a country wanting to block the Paris Agreement is to blame the process, as the 
climate negotiations are perhaps notorious for. The tactic worked in Copenhagen, given the closed-door 
negotiations and leaked documents. The phrase “party-driven process” and calls for “inclusive” and 
“transparent” negotiations became common mantras in the UNFCCC, used by developing countries to 
ensure their participation. The French Presidency undertook considerable efforts to align with these 
norms, which Ciplet, Roberts and Khan (2015) show can help facilitate consent by those less powerful. 
Each evening of the second week, the COP President convened the Comité de Paris, an open session for 
all. Overnight, indabas, open, high-level negotiations, would meet on specific issues. The indaba co-
chairs included delegates from countries known to block decisions, such as Venezuela. Presidency team 
members would brief delegations, outlining the Agreement’s contours without showing the whole text. 
Agreement drafts were distributed in plenary, a tactic specifically meant to allay concerns over 
preferential treatment by ensuring that parties received the text at the same time.  
These negotiation strategies worked, although there was already considerable pressure to uphold the 
legitimacy of previous agreements and bring the US into a legally-binding climate treaty. Given the 
legitimacy the Paris Agreement holds as a product agreed to by states, President Trump’s decision to 
withdraw from the Paris Agreement was a deep betrayal. Countries agreed to a treaty that was built 
upon legitimate institutions, with US involvement, and negotiated in a transparent process. The decision 
to withdraw rebuked the foundations on which developing country support was based. In the bid to win 
US participation, countries adopted a treaty that could lose the planet. Then, they lost the US. 
Locked into the “Best” Alternative? 
Is the future as bleak as the past? The Paris Agreement is designed to endure, offering no opportunities 
to revisit its design. Parties are locked in the cycles of submission, reporting, global stocktake, and 
resubmission of NDCs. Even if those reviews, and the many other reports on the state of the global 
climate, show that the global response is inadequate, parties remain in the same circle.  
Some, including Higham (2017), argue that the Agreement should be considered in its broader context, 
including the mobilization of non-state actors as a second foundation of the Agreement. Institutions 
such as the Non-state Actor Zone for Climate Action (NAZCA Portal) and Lima-Paris Action Agenda 
(LPAA) helped highlight, synthesize, and further non-state actors climate actions (Morgan & Northrop, 
2017). These institutions align non-state actors’ efforts with the overall social structure and goals of the 
UNFCCC, which can confer legitimacy on their actions (Bernstein 2011). This legitimacy and the 
orchestration efforts of the Secretariat are clearly important to overall climate action. But they are not a 
substitute for meaningful, ambitious climate action by states. The Paris Agreement may have passed 
responsibility to non-state actors. The “all hands on deck” approach that Hale (2016) describes requires 
states as drivers, implementers, and funders of mitigation and adaptation efforts. What the Agreement 
largely lays out, however, is a reliance on the status quo.   
But it has lofty goals, leading some, such as Clémençon (2016) to characterize the Agreement as 
aspirational, rather than substantive.  Developing countries, and the world, consented to an inadequate 
treaty, pinning their hopes on a long-term vision of how climate governance could learn and grow in the 
multilateral system. 
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